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 To be sure, Gauthier’s account is subject to 
another objection to contractarianism, to which I 
have already alluded: He supposes that the basic 
contract would be shaped by the relative bargain-
ing power of the parties involved. Rawls’s and 
Harsanyi’s versions avoid this problem, for they 
insist that one must consider what persons would do 
when a decision must be reached under conditions 
of radical uncertainty (where one’s relative power 
vis-à-vis others is unknown). A more convinc-
ing approach, perhaps, would be to argue, as this 
author does, that there would be significant negative 
long-range consequences for all if persons were to 
continually press whatever relative advantages they 
have over others. 
 Edward McClennen 
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 SOCIAL CONVENTIONS 
 This entry reviews the major theoretical accounts 
of social conventions. It first introduces briefly their 
philosophical origin and then goes on to present the 
first contemporary systematic account of social con-
ventions in terms of game theory. This is followed by 
an overview of some of the main theories and uses 
of social conventions in current work in the philoso-
phy of social science. 
 Introduction 
 Many of our everyday social interactions are regu-
lated by  conventions. Eating manners, the kind of 
clothes we wear at the office, and the side of the 
road on which we drive are a few mundane exam-
ples. Roughly, a social convention is  a customary, 
 arbitrary,  and self-enforcing rule of behavior that 
is generally followed and expected to be followed 
in a group or in a society at large. When a social 
convention is established, everybody behaves in a 
quasi-agreed-upon way, even if they did not in fact 
explicitly agree to do so. A social convention can 
thus be seen as a kind of  tacit agreement that has 
evolved out of a history of previous interactions. 
 The study of social convention is relevant for 
the social sciences since much of social order can 
in fact be explained in terms of conventions and, 
thus, as social regularities that emerge and are sus-
tained without the need of centralized planning and 
external enforcement by the state. In philosophy, the 
notion of social convention is appealing especially 
to those who aim to formulate naturalistic theories 
of normative phenomena in general (i.e., obligation, 
law) and of morality in particular. 
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 Origin: David Hume 
 The 18th-century Scottish philosopher David Hume 
was the first to point to the relevance of conven-
tional regularities to addressing both of these issues. 
Aiming in particular to demystify the nature of 
property and justice, Hume suggested that a conven-
tion corresponds to a pattern of mutually beneficial 
behavior that a group of agents follow when they 
know that such a pattern is mutually beneficial and 
that they expect each other to follow this pattern 
instead of another. 
 First Systematic Account: David Lewis 
 In modern times, the Humean approach to conven-
tions has been revived by the philosopher David 
Lewis, whose theory clarifies the customary, arbi-
trary, and self-enforcing nature of conventions. 
Adopting a  game-theoretic approach, Lewis pro-
posed that a convention is a solution to a  coordi-
nation  problem arising in recurrent interactions. A 
coordination problem is considered as a situation 
characterized by at least two coordination equilib-
ria. A coordination equilibrium is a combination of 
actions—one for each player—in which each player 
is strictly motivated to perform his component of the 
combination, conditional on his believing that the 
other players will perform theirs. Moreover, there 
exists at least one alternative combination of actions 
that has the same property. Finally, for each player, 
if a player performs his share of the combination, he 
prefers that the other players perform theirs. When 
an interaction contains at least two coordination 
equilibria and when coincidence of interests between 
the players prevails, the players are facing a coordi-
nation problem. 
 A classical example of a coordination prob-
lem is that of choosing the same side of the road 
in order to drive safely. If, in a society, a regular-
ity in behavior in which each individual picks his 
share of a coordination equilibrium is established, 
then, according to Lewis’s definition, this regularity 
is a convention. Since a conventional regularity is 
sustained if there is a system of concordant mutual 
expectations of conformity, a crucial component of 
any theory of convention is explaining the origins 
of these concordant mutual expectations. According 
to Lewis, the source of these mutual expectations is 
 precedent: If the agents have a shared acquaintance 
with instances of successful coordination in a class 
of similar situations in the past, they will project this 
pattern into the future. Precedent is seen as a source 
of one kind of salience, which makes one coordina-
tion equilibrium a focal point and thus prominent 
with respect to any possible alternative. 
 Contemporary Approaches 
 The focus of Lewis’s theory is mainly on how con-
ventions, once established, reproduce themselves. A 
compatible but complementary approach addresses 
the problem of how conventional regularities emerge 
in the first place. Combining insights coming from 
theoretical biology, Robert Sugden, for instance, has 
employed  evolutionary game  theory to study the ori-
gins of conventions. The most general mechanism 
that has been suggested to explain their evolution 
is that of  symmetry breaking. Avoiding collisions at 
a crossroad, for instance, requires a rule that speci-
fies who is supposed to stop and who is supposed 
to move forward. Since, however, in the absence of 
any convention the positions of all the drivers are 
symmetrical, by observing each other’s behavior, the 
evolutionary dynamics cannot converge on one of 
the coordination equilibria. However, if the players 
can also discriminate among contextual features of 
their situation, they might exploit an arbitrary sym-
metry to solve this problem. For instance, if drivers 
condition their behavior on who is coming from the 
right, they might evolve a convention that assigns 
priority to those coming from that side of the road. 
Thus, arbitrary cues can boost the evolution of arbi-
trary regularities. 
 Though the importance of conventions in solving 
coordination problems has been exploited in many 
areas of the social sciences (from economics to lin-
guistics and law), limiting the role of conventions 
only to situations in which the interests of the play-
ers coincide is indeed an undue restriction. Actually, 
theoretical models in biology, economics, and phi-
losophy have shown that together with conventions 
of coordination, conventions of  partial conflict can 
also emerge and stabilize. Robert Sugden and Brian 
Skyrms have shown, for instance, that a conven-
tion of partial conflict in which property rights are 
assigned to the first person to take possession of a 
previously unowned item can evolve by exploiting 
the same symmetry-breaking mechanism sketched 
above. 
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 Finally, even if a social convention is often 
regarded as a mere regularity in behavior, it has 
often been suggested that it also has a  normative 
force. Margaret Gilbert, for instance, has argued 
that a social convention has an intrinsic normativity 
that can be accounted for only in terms of a holistic 
approach that appeals to social concepts not reduc-
ible to what the individuals are personally commit-
ted to do. In contrast, for other authors, like Robert 
Sugden and Ken Binmore, for instance, beliefs that 
one ought to conform to the prevailing conventions 
develop on top of such regularities and recruit natu-
ral human sentiments. In this naturalistic perspective, 
moral norms develop out of mere social conventions. 
 Luca Tummolini 
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 SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
 In simplest terms, social epistemology is the norma-
tive study of knowledge as a social product. It is a 
cross-disciplinary nomad, equally at home in philos-
ophy and policy. There is disagreement over whether 
it is meant to be a branch of epistemology or sociol-
ogy, or rather the entirety of one or the other or both 
of these disciplines. This entry begins by discussing 
three types of social epistemology that canvass these 
possibilities, followed by an extended discussion 
of the most ambitious form of social epistemology, 
which attempts to bridge the analytic/continental 
divide within contemporary philosophy, while pro-
viding an account of the social construction of intel-
lectual progress. 
 Three Types of Social Epistemology 
 Social epistemology may be regarded in one of three 
ways: (1) as a branch of sociology, (2) as a branch of 
epistemology, or (3) as a field that transcends the dif-
ference between (1) and (2). Let us take each in turn. 
1.  As a branch of sociology, social epistemology 
asserts that social relations can be organized in terms 
of the differential, often hierarchical, access that a 
society’s members have to a common reality. Plato 
originally advanced a static version of this thesis in 
the  Republic. There, each level of human under-
standing—from the ideal to the base—corresponded 
to a stratum in a myth-based caste system. A more 
dynamic version, based on the stages of human 
intellectual progress, was advanced more than 
2,000 years later by Auguste Comte in his positivist 
polity. In this context, earlier religious and meta-
physical forms of epistemic authority served atavis-
tic class–like functions in a science-led social order. 
The general idea continues to fascinate philoso-
phers, as it raises the prospect of nonviolent, large-
scale social control by deference to expertise, also 
known as “division of cognitive labor.” Indeed, 
such knowledge-based politics is arguably the most 
Machiavellian of all, as it delegates the application 
of force to individuals, whose willed compliance is 
socially rewarded with the assignment of rational-
ity. The history of medicine probably provides the 
clearest traces of this issue. 
2.  As a branch of epistemology, social episte-
mology asserts that an adequate grasp of the state 
of knowledge in society requires more than general-
izing from what a single ideal (Cartesian) or average 
(Humean) mind knows. It requires recognizing 
the distributed nature of knowledge, either emergent 
on specific forms of life (i.e., folkways) or divided 
according to some overarching rational plan (e.g., 
science). But in both cases, the whole knowledge 
system is much more—and even other—than 
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